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approach. This case dealt with a coal purification process in which
scraps of slate and rock were placed in huge dumps called culm banks.
Often these piles ignited through spontaneous combustion and gave
off sulphur dioxide gas, but on one occasion hydrogen sulfide was given
off. This caused discoloration of the paint on the plaintiff's house.
The court denied liability, ruling that the invasion of the plaintiff's
land was not intentional and that even if it were, it certainly was not
unreasonable.
The Restatement Rule has also incorporated the principle of
ultrahazardous activity,29 an uncommon activity involving a risk of
serious harm which cannot be eliminated by the use of utmost care.
A certain degree of criticism can be leveled at both approaches. The
absolute nuisance approach, though simple in form, may be too rigid
to permit any elasticity in its application. The Restatement approach,
while an attempt to clear up the confusion of existing case law, has
combined various rules thus making recovery even more difficult al-
though obvious damage has resulted.
Nuisance is a term often resorted to in an effort to impose liability
in furtherance of policy considerations when the value of private prop-
erty rights are weighed against the danger often caused by industry
and the profits made from causing this danger.30 But courts fol-
lowing the reasoning adopted in the principal case have departed
from this categorization of nuisance. The Restatement view has left
a substantially damaged individual without remedy. In a day when
there is a growing concern for pure air and when highly developed
industry no longer needs fostering by the courts, it may be in the best
interest of society to adopt universally the rule of absolute nuisance.
CHARLES MATTHEW BERGER
LANDLORD'S DUTY TO REMOVE SNOW AND ICE
Natural accumulations of snow and ice create dangerous condi-
tions for apartment tenants using common areas under control of the
landlord. Whether a landlord of a multiple-unit dwelling has a duty to
remove such accumulations from the common areas, such as side-
walks, over which he has retained control, is not well settled.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was presented with
"'-RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 520 (1939).
-1i HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 1.24, at 69 (i956).
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this question for the first time in Langhorne Road Apartments, Inc.
v. Bisson.1 Frederick J. Bisson, a tenant in the Langhorne Road Apart-
ments, sustained serious back injuries when he slipped and fell on
snow and ice which had accumulated on a sidewalk maintained and
controlled by defendant Langhorne Road Apartments. A snowstorm
ending the morning of the day of the accident had caused an accumula-
tion of approximately four inches. Bisson contended that the de-
fendant was under a duty to use reasonable care to remove the snow
and ice from the private sidewalk within a reasonable time after the
storm had ceased. Langhorne maintained that it was under no such
duty in absence of an express or implied agreement to do so. The
court upheld Bisson's contention and affirmed the trial court verdict
awarding $l5,ooo in damages to Bisson for injuries sustained in his fall.
At common law, when a landlord leases parts of the premises to
individual tenants, as in an apartment building, he necessarily retains
control over the areas of common use and must use reasonable care
to keep these areas in a reasonably safe condition.2 This duty arises
because areas of common use are part of the estate reserved by the
landlord for the use and benefit of all the tenants.3 However, Massa-
'207 Va. 474, 150 S.E.2d 540 (1966).
2Lord v. Lencshire House, Ltd., 272 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. '959); Mudd v. Gray,
200 Ala. 92, 75 So. 468 (1917); McDonell v. American Trust Co., i3o Cal. App.
2d 296, 279 P.2d 138 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); VanSchaack & Co. v. Perkins, 129 Colo.
567, 272 P.2d 269 (1954); Torre v. DeReazo, 143 Conn. 302, 122 A.2d 25 (1956);
Grochowsky v. Stewart, 53 Del. 33o, 169 A.2d 14 (1961); Shiroma v. Itano, io Ill. App.
2d 428, 135 N.E.2d 123 (1956); Bostian V. Jewell, 254 Iowa 1289, 121 N.V.2d 141
(1963); Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 320 P.2d 1029 (1958); Mackey v. Allen,
396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965); Horr v. Jones, 157 Me. 1, 17o A.2d 144 (1961); Elmar
Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 277 Md. 454, 177 A.2d 263 (1962); Strong v. Shefveland,
249 Minn. 59, 81 N.V.2d 247 (1957); Turnipseed v. McGee, 236 Miss. 159, 1o9 So.
2d 551 ('959); Feld v. Frankel, 351 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. 1961); Lake v. Emigh, 121 Mont.
87, 190 P.2d 550 (1948); Schwab v. Allou Corp., 177 Neb. 342, 128 N.W.2d 835
(1964); Ahearn v. Roux, 96 N.H. 71, 69 A.2d 701 (1949); Doud v. Housing Authority,
75 N.J. Super. 340, 183 A.2d 149 (1962); Benjamin v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 22
App. Div. 2d 68, 253 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1964); Reese v. Piedmont, Inc., 24o N.C. 391, 82
S.E.2d 365 ((1954); McCullagh v. Fortune, 76 N.D. 669, 38 N.W.2d 771 (1949); Sidle
v. Humphrey, 8 Ohio App. 2d 25, 22o N.E.2d 678 (1966); Staples v. Baty, 2o6 Okla.
288, 242 P.2d 705 (1952); Pritchard v. Terrill, 189 Ore. 662, 222 P.2d 652 (1950);
Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 2o5 A.2d 68o (1964); Reek v. Lutz, go R.I.
34o, 158 A.2d 145 (1960); West v. Hanley, 73 S.D. 540, 45 N.W.2d 455 (95o); Grizzell
v. Foxx, 48 Tenn. App. 462, 348 S.W.2d 815 (196o); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149
Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 6o9 (1950); Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368
(1925); Beaulac v. Robie, 92 Vt. 27, 102 At. 88 (1917); Williamson v. Welman,
156 Va. 417, 158 S.E. 777 (1931); Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125, 401 P.2d
642 (1965); Marsh v. Riley, 118 W.Va. 52, 188 S.E. 748 (1936).
3Schedler v. Wagner, 37 Wash. 2d 612, 225 P.2d 213 (195o), rev'd on other
grounds, 230 P.2d 6oo (195 0 .
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chusetts4 and perhaps a few other states5 interpret the landlord's
common-law duty narrowly and require him only to "'use reasonable
care to keep common areas in as good condition as that in which
they were or appeared to be at the time of the creation of the
tenancy.' -6
The question whether either the broad or the narrow interpretation
of the landlord's duty as to areas of common use includes a duty to
remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from such areas has
given rise to three different views. For convenience, these views are
referred to as: (i) the Massachusetts Rule, (2) the New York Rule, and
(8) the Connecticut Rule.
Under the Massachusetts Rule, the landlord has no duty to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice from common areas unless
there is an express or implied agreement to do so. 7 This rule has been
unwaveringly adhered to by Massachusetts,8 although its exact basis
is unclear. Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.,9 which established
the rule in Massachusetts, fails to state any reasons for its adoption,
and subsequent cases have tended to follow the rule blindly. Never-
theless, the Massachusetts Rule is followed in a minority of the states.10
A few of these states have attempted to justify the rule by saying that
snow and ice are "transitory" dangers arising from purely "natural"
causes and to impose a duty on the landlord to remove them would
subject him to an unreasonable burden of vigilance and care in
kRegan v. Nelson, 345 Mass. 678, 189 N.E.2d 516 (1963); Sordillo v. Fradkin, 282
Mass. 255, 184 N.E. 666 (1933); Baum v. Ahlborn, 210 Mass. 336, 96 N.E. 671 (1911).
'See Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat'l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 139 At. 82 (1927);
McGinnis v. Keylon, 135 Wash. 588, 238 Pac. 631 (1925). But see Thompson v.
Frankus, 151 Me. 54, 115 A.2d 718 (1955). Wisconsin once followed this position,
see Dowling v. Nuebling, 97 Wis. 350, 72 N.W. 871 (1897), but later abandoned it
by judicial decision, Inglehardt v. Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 8o8 (1914), and
by statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § ioi.o6 (1965).
ORegan v. Nelson, 345 Mass. 678, 189 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1963).
'Voods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 (1883).
OCairns v. Giumentaro, 339 Mass. 675, 162 N.E.2d 61 (1959); Carey v. Malley,
327 Mass. 189, 97 N.E.2d 645 (1951); McNeil v. Home Say. Bank, 313 Mass. 664,
48 N.E.2d 695 (1943); Bell v. Siegel, 242 Mass. 380, 136 N.E. 109 (1922).
'134 Mass. 357 (1883).
1
0Cronin v. Brownlie, 348 Ill. App. 448, lo9 N.E.2d 352 (1952); Purcell v.
English, 86 Ind. 34 (1882); Rosenburg v. Chapman Nat'l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 139
Atl. 82 (1927); Burke v. O'Neil, 192 Minn. 492, 257 N.W. 81 (1934); Root v. Henry,
395 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. 1965); Turnoff v. Richman, 76 Ohio App. 83, 61 N.E.2d
486 (1944); Pomfret v. Fletcher, 208 A.2d 743 (R.I. 1965); Schedler v. Wagner, 37
Wash. 2d 612, 225 P.2d 213 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 230 P.2d 6oo (1951);
Holcomb v. Szymczyk, 186 Wis. 99, 2o2 N.W. 188 (925). But see Durkin v. Lewitz,
3 I1. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954); Sidle v. Humphrey, 8 Ohio App. 2d 25,
22o N.E.2d 678 (1966); Oswald v. Jeraj, 140 Ohio App. 676, 67 N.E.2d 779 (1946).
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geographical areas where snow is common." The rule has also been
explained as a consequence of following Massachusetts' narrow inter-
pretation of the landlord's common-law duty with respect to common
areas over which he has maintained control.12 However, while these
states continue to follow the Massachusetts snow and ice rule, they
have either liberalized 3 or abandoned 4 the narrow interpretation
of a landlord's commoni-law duty as applied to other situations. The
remaining states which clearly follow the Massachusetts snow and ice
rule have always followed the majority rule requiring the landlord to
use reasonable care to keep common areas in reasonably safe condi-
tion.' 5 These courts usually support their position by merely stating
that the Massachusetts Rule is the proper one for their jurisdiction.' 6
It appears that none of the states following the Massachusetts snow
and ice rule adopt the apparent premise behind the rule: that a
tenant impliedly assumes any unsafe condition not specifically pro-
vided against by his lease.Y7 Thus, the only basis for the rule with any
support in states other than Massachusetts is a policy against placing
too great a burden on a landlord.' 8 Both bases for the Massachusetts
"Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34, 43 (1882); Schwab v. Allou Corp., 177 Neb.
342, 128 N.W.2d 835, 839 (196o).
12Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954).
'3Horr v. James, 156 Me. 1, 17o A.2d 144 (1961); Thompson v. Frankus, 151
Me. 54, 115 A.2d 718 (1955). In Miller v. Hopper, 119 Me. 529, 112 At. 256, 257
(1921), speaking of the strict common-law interpretations, the court said: "As applied
to the plan of construction, the position is sound.... But the application of this
doctrine to repairs made necessary by wear, breaking, or decay is opposed to the
great weight of authority. We conceive the true rule to be that the owner must
exercise due care to keep in reasonably safe repair stainays and passageways
which remain under his control."
"See Fiegenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125, 401 P.2d 642 (1965); Inglehardt v.
Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 8o8 (19g4).
2
5
Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, i8o Ind. 357, 1o N.E. 915 (1913);
Sherman v. Bobrecker, 322 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1959); Reek v. Lutz, go R.I. 340, 158
A.2d 145 (196o).
'aWoodley v. Bush, 272 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App. 1954); Pomfret v. Fletcher, 2o8
A.2d 743 (R.I. 1965).
'7See O'Malley v. Twenty-Five Associates, 178 Mass. 555, 6o N.E. 387, 388
(sgoi), "No doubt when the lessor retains control, he owes a duty, and in some
cases ... the duty has been spoken of... as a duty to keep the article or place
reasonably safe. But the tenant must take things as he finds them .... There is no
implied undertaking or duty.., to make things better than they are."
1sSee Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34, 43 (1882), "If any other rule is adopted,
then the owner is charged with the duty of watching steps leading to every part of
the premises, and of keeping them free from all temporary obstructions; for, let
it once be granted that the landlord is liable for obstructions or defects not perma-
nent and not growing out of the character of the structure, it will be impossible
to draw any line, and he must be held accountable for all obstructions and defects,
no matter how transient their character."
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snow and ice rule, the policy consideration and the strict concept of
a landlord's duty, are subject to the criticism that they are outdated.
The emergence of modern apartment houses has created situations
vastly different from the rural-type dwellings existing at the time these
bases were developed; therefore, these bases are not particularly
applicable to situations involving today's modern multiple-unit
dwellings.10
Under the New York Rule a landlord has no duty to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice,20 unless the ice has formed
into ridges and hummocks. 21 The courts reasoned that the duty of a
landlord of a multiple-unit dwelling to keep common areas under
his control free from snow and ice is like that of a municipal corpora-
tion in its care of sidewalks or that of a railroad company in its care
of train platforms.22 Therefore, in New York a landlord is charged
only with a duty to remove snow and ice which constitutes an obstacle
to travel and is something more than slipperiness, such as ridges or
hummocks.23 Although this rule is difficult to apply and was originally
laid down by a lower court,24 New York strictly adhered to it,25
until a recent case 26 held that a landlord's failure to keep paths clear
of snow and ice was a violation of the New York Multiple Dwelling
Law.
2 7
"'See Langley Park Apartments, Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 62o,
623 (1964): "In any one unit are apt to be the very young and the very old, non-
working residents who seldom venture far beyond the apartment complex. They,
and all others lawfully using the common walkways, must be provided with reason-
ably safe approaches to and from their apartments and the public streets. To
expect these tenants to assume the duty of maintaining the common walks would be
impractical. Aside from the problem of assigning areas of responsibility, the
average tenant is ill equipped to perform the task of snow removal. It is not
feasible to expect that he has and can store the necessary implements and other
equipment required to keep the walks clear."
-mLittle v. Writh, 6 Misc. 3o1, 26 N.Y. Supp. 1110 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. 1893).
nVan Slyke v. Fivey, 266 App. Div. 889, 42 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1943); Harkin v.
Crumbie, 20 Misc. 568, 46 N.Y. Supp. 453 (1897); see Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 258 App. Div. 74 o , 15 N.Y.S.2d .oo (0939); Dwyer v. Woollard, 2o5 App.
Div. 546, 199 N.Y.S. App. 840 (1923); Valentine v. State, 197 Misc. 972, 95 N.Y.S.2d
827 (Ct. Cl.), afl'd, 272 App. Div. 1o69, 1oo NXY.S.2d 567 (1950).
2Harkin v. Crumbie, 20 ,Misc. 568, 46 N.Y. Supp. 453, 455 (1897).
nibid.
!'Ibid.
=See Klein v. U.S., 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964); Van Slyke v. Fivey, 226 App.
Div. 889, 42 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1943); Dwyer v. Woollard, 205 App. Div. 546, 199 N.Y.S.
App. 840 (1923).
2'Greenstein v. Springfield Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 740, 204 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y.C.
City Ct. 1960).
"N.Y. MULT. DWELL. § 8 (1) (1954), "The owner shall keep all and every part
of a multiple dwelling, the lot on which it is situated, and the roofs, yards, courts,
1967]
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The Connecticut Rule,28 which is followed by a majority of the
states,29 imposes upon a landlord a duty to use reasonable care to
see that common areas are kept reasonably safe from the dangers
created by accumulations of snow and ice.3 0 Courts adopting the rule
reason that the landlord has a duty to keep common approaches free
of defects or dangerous conditions, and the fact that the dangerous
condition was created by purely natural causes does not create such
a distinction so as to relieve the landlord of this duty.3' Just what is
necessary to constitute reasonable care under this rule is usually a
jury question. However, to impose liability for failure to perform his
duty it must be established that the landlord had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition.3 2 In Sheehan v. Sette,33 where
the steps to the apartment building were wet and slushy at 6:45 A.M.,
were beginning to freeze at 9:00 A.M., and the tenant slipped and
passages, areas or alleys appurtenant thereto, clean and free from vermin, dirt, filth,
garbage or other thing or matter dangerous to life or health." In fact Greenstein
v. Springfield Corp., supra note 26, seems to place New York within the majority
Connecticut Rule, see note 28 infra and accompanying text, because the statutory
definition of the type of dwellings for which the landlord would be liable for
failure to remove snow and ice includes all types of multiple dwellings, see N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. § 4 (8) (1954).
mReardon v. Shimelman, 1o2 Conn. 383, 128 Atl. 705 (1925).
-'C.W. Simpson Co. v. Langley, 131 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Robinson v.
Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., 94 Cola. 534, 31 P.2d 918 (1934); Reardon v.
Shimelman, 1o2 Conn. 383, 128 At. 705 (1925); Young v. Saroukos, 185 A.2d 274
(Super. Ct. 1962), afJfd, 189 A.2d 437 (Del. 1963); Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695,
131 S.E.2d 651 (1963); Reuter v. Iowa Trust 8: Sav. Bank, 244 Iowa 939, 57 N.WV.2d
225 (1953); Langley Park Apartments, Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620
(1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59, 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957); Thompson v.
Resnik, 85 N.H. 413, 159 Atl. 355 (1932); Skupienski v. Maly, 27 N.J. 240, 142 A.2d
220 (1958); Sidle v. Humphrey, 8 Ohio App. 2d 25, 22o N.E.2d 678 (1966); Massor
v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569, 3 P.2d 784 ('93i); Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 205
A.2d 68o (1964); Grizzell v. Foxx, 48 Tenn. App. 462, 348 S.W.2d 815 (1960); see
Schwab v. Allou Corp., 177 Neb. 342, 128 N.W.2d 835 (1964). But see Burke v.
O'Neil, 192 Minn. 492, 257 N.W. 81 (1934); Goodman v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 331 Pa. 587, 2oo At. 642 (1938).
01o2 Conn. 383, 128 Atl. 705 (1925).
"'Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 Atl. 705, 7o6-07 (1925): "Approach-
ing the question from the standpoint of principle, we are wholly unable to justify
the Massachusetts rule. The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable
care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous conditions in the com-
mon approaches, the fact that a particular danger arose from the fall of snow
or the freezing of ice can afford no ground of distinction. Indeed, the causes which
are at work to produce it are no more natural causes than are those which more
slowly, bring about the decay of wood or the rusting of iron. To set apart this
particular source of danger is to create a distinction without a sound difference."
3Sheehan v. Sette, 13o Conn. 295, 33 A.2d 327 (1943); Drible v. Village Improve-
ment Co., 123 Conn. 2o, 192 Atl. 3o8 (1937).
813o Conn. 295, 33 A.2d 327 (1943).
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fell at 11:3o A.M., the landlord was held to constructive notice. The
court found the conditions to be such that the landlord in exercise
of reasonable supervision should have known of the dangerous condi-
tion of the premises.34 On the other hand, constructive notice was
not imposed in Drible v. Village Improvement Co.35 where the land-
lord had swept the sidewalk clear the morning of the day of the
accident, there had been no new snowfall, and the temperature had
not risen above freezing prior to the accident. The court concluded
that in light of these conditions the landlord in exercise of reasonable
supervision would not necessarily have known of the icy condition
caused by people tracking snow upon the steps.
Under the Connecticut Rule a landlord is allowed to wait until
a reasonable time after the end of the storm before removing the
snow and ice, since changing conditions during the storm render it
inexpedient and impractical to take earlier effective action.36 No cases
have been found which state what would be a reasonable time for
a landlord to wait before removing snow and ice. However, in Boyle
v. Baldowski,37 where the storm ended at 7:3o A.M. and the tenant
slipped and fell on icy stairs leading to the apartment at 10:45 A.M.,
the court held that three hours and fifteen minutes was an unreason-
able time for the landlord to wait before removing the snow and ice.
Having acted within a reasonable time to remove the danger, a
landlord still must have performed this act in such a manner as to
render the common area reasonably safe. Whether the landlord has
made the common area reasonably safe is a jury question. However,
the tenant has a right to assume a "workmanlike" effort will be made
to keep the area safe,38 and if patches of snow and ice are not re-
moved or rendered harmless the area is not reasonably safe.39
Bisson has added Virginia to the increasing number of jurisdictions
which support the Connecticut Rule.40 This decision has greatly
3 'Ibid.
3 123 Conn. 20, 192 At. 308 (1937).
'Young v. Sarouhous, 185 A.2d 274 (Super. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 189 A.2d 437 (Del.
1963); Goodman v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank, 331 Pa. 587, 2oo At. 642 (1938); Grizzell
v. Foxx, 48 Tenn. App. 462, 348 S.W.2d 815 (1960). Contra, Pessagno v. Euclid Inv.
Co., 112 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (must use reasonable care during the storm to
remove or render harmless).
1117 N.J.L. 320, i88 Ad. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
sRobinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., 94 Colo. 534, 31 P.2d 918
(1934).
3Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., 94 Colo. 534, 31 P.2d 918
(1934); Visaggi v. Frank's Bar & Grill, 4 N.J. 93, 71 A.2d 638 (1950).
"aThis decision was not entirely unexpected in light of Virginia decisions in
related areas. See Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 2o6 Va. 412, 143 S.E.2d 907 (1965)
(landlord not insurer of tenant's safety); Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 65 S.E.2d
1967]
